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Abstract 
 
Family politicization has been found to affect the recruitment process of election candidates 
and political officeholders. This phenomenon can be explained by both supply-side factors 
(i.e. higher levels of political socialization and motivation) and demand-side factors (i.e. name 
recognition). In the present study, we investigated whether family politicization also affects 
party membership activity, which is situated lower on the participation ladder and does not 
require election, thus rendering demand-side factors less relevant. 
Our results demonstrate that family politicization plays a role in campaign activities (e.g. 
distributing leaflets) and legitimization activities (e.g. electing the party leader). However, for 
more time-consuming activities such as policy-oriented matters, supply-side factors alone do 
not give party members from a politicized family an advantage compared to other party 
members. 
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Introduction 
 
The democratization of political recruitment is one of the major developments in Western 
countries since the end of the 19
th
 century (Best & Cotta, 2000). Democratic elections are now 
deeply embedded in most political systems and they are presumed to entail free access and 
equal opportunities to all citizens. Many studies have, however, indicated representational 
imbalances regarding gender, education, age or ethnicity (e.g. Best & Cotta, 2000; Bovens & 
Wille, 2010). Moreover, it has been shown on several occasions that political elites tend to 
come disproportionately from politicized family backgrounds. From presidents over ministers 
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and members of parliament (MPs) to local officeholders and even election candidates, a 
disproportionate amount of have parents who held political office before (e.g. Hess, 1997; 
Kurtz, 1993 ; Patriat & Parodi, 1992; Dal Bó, Dal Bó, & Snyder, 2009; Van Liefferinge & 
Steyvers, 2009). This overrepresentation has been explained by means of Norris’ recruitment 
model (1996), pointing out that it is due to a good match between supply-side factors (i.e. 
higher levels of political socialization and motivation) and demand-side factors (i.e. being 
more attractive to voters due to name recognition and name loyalty), in combination with a 
favorable opportunity structure (‘personalization’ and ‘mediatization’ of politics are said to be 
beneficial for politicians from politicized families) (Van Liefferinge, 2012). Our central 
question here is whether family politicization also influences activities for which only supply-
side factors play a role. In particular, we will shift our focus to party members and explore the 
effect of family politicization on participation in internal party activities. As party members 
do not need to be elected in order to participate, demand factors are less relevant to explain 
their participation behavior.  
 
The objective of this study is twofold. We will map to what extent family politicization is 
present among party members and then explain how it affects members’ intra-party activity 
level.  
Our first objective involves examining the degree of family politicization among party 
members in Belgium. As party membership activity is a form of participation that involves 
fewer efforts and obstacles than, for example, a political mandate (Whiteley, 2011), we 
hypothesize that family politicization plays a more limited role in this. To investigate this 
hypothesis, we will determine how many party members have a parent who was also a party 
member and whether or not they are members of the same party. When possible, we will 
compare our results with previous research on election candidates and elected representatives 
(e.g. Van Liefferinge, 2012).   
A second goal of our analysis is to determine whether supply-side factors alone can explain 
family politicization effects on participation behavior. Questions that are relevant in this 
respect include whether family party members are more active than others and, if so, in what 
kind of party activities. If this is the case, we can expect family politicization to also have an 
impact on activities in which demand factors (such as name recognition) do not play a major 
role. Our findings can also be relevant for the literature on the decline in party membership 
figures. In almost all European countries, the number of party members have been decreasing 
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since the 1980s (e.g. Whiteley, 2011; Van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012.). Although 
evidence is inconclusive, it is often feared that fewer members in a party will lead to less 
party activity, since the same workload has to be divided among fewer people (Voerman & 
Van Schuur, 2011). Consequently, some party functions may no longer be executed to the full 
extent. If family members indeed are more active than average, this could mitigate the 
detrimental effects of the decrease in party membership figures. 
 
We base our study on a survey of party members of four Belgian (Flemish) political parties. 
This survey with specific questions on party membership activity and on parents’ membership 
allows us to thoroughly investigate the impact of family politicization on a wide range of 
party activities.  
This article is structured as follows. We will start by outlining a theoretical framework about 
family politicization, followed by a discussion of the various functions that are performed by 
party members. After formulating our hypotheses and describing our methodology, we will 
present the results of our empirical analysis. To conclude, we will discuss the main findings of 
this article and reflect on whether family members could be safeguard for declining parties. 
 
Family politicization 
In this section, we will present relevant insights from the literature on family politicization. 
First, we will briefly elaborate on the concept and illustrate its current relevance. We will 
present a pyramid (based on the intensity of participation) for the parents, and one for the 
children. The links between both pyramids are helpful for explaining the different effects of 
family politicization. Second, we will turn to the more substantial meaning of family 
politicization as an awakener of political interest, a value transmitter and a stimulator for 
political participation.  
 
Family politicization: concept, current relevance and appearance 
 
Family politicization is not an unequivocal concept. It involves two levels of political 
participation, one for the parents and one for their child(ren).
1
 As for the underlying 
mechanism of family politicization, broad support exists for Prewitt’s ‘overexposure 
hypothesis’ (1970), meaning that children growing up in politically engaged families from a 
                                                          
1
 In a broader sense, family politicization can also refer to other family members than parents, but these are 
the scope of this paper. 
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young age onwards receive a relatively high amount of political incentives, which may leave a 
lasting impression on their future political attitudes and engagement. Prewitt differentiates 
between two types of family political inheritance. The first type can be captured under the 
heading of political dynasties and involves children following in their parent’s political career 
footsteps. The second type is the inheritance of a specific interest in political affairs. This type 
includes parents who pass on a general attention or even a passion for politics.  
 
The current relevance of family politicization could be questioned, however. From a historical 
perspective, social background has lost much of its significance for political recruitment due 
to processes of democratization and professionalization (Best & Cotta, 2000; Rush, 2007). 
The process of democratization refers to opening up political arenas for those formerly 
excluded. It consists of several aspects, among others granting suffrage rights, granting 
political rights, mobilization and effective representation. As a consequence, elites from 
aristocratic backgrounds (often found in a limited number of interconnected families) became 
less numerous in parliaments. Despite this historical relativity, it cannot be denied that the 
political profession remains an occupation in which intergenerational following is more than 
coincidentally present. In fact, compared to other occupations, politicians appear to have the 
highest ‘dynastic bias’, i.e. the highest number of intergenerational followers (Dal Bó, Dal 
Bó, & Snyder, 2009). Although this topic has not been extensively addressed in political 
science, an overrepresentation of family members in elected bodies has been reported in 
various countries such as the United States (Hess, 1997; Kurtz, 1993), Japan (Fukai & Fukui, 
1992), France (Patriat & Parodi, 1992), and the United Kingdom (Rush, 2012). In Belgium, 
too, family politicization continues to be highly relevant. In the early 1990s, more than one 
out of six MPs had a parent who (had) held political office (De Winter, 1992). Over one fifth 
of all Belgian mayors (22.6%) during the 2000-2006 legislative term had a father in political 
office, and approximately half of them (47.7%) had a father who was a party member (Van 
Liefferinge & Steyvers, 2009). 
 
Depending on what level of political participation it is situated, family politicization will have 
a different appearance, relevance and impact. We have visualized this in two pyramid-like 
continuums: one for the parents’ activity and one for the child(ren)’s activity. These pyramids 
are built up according to the intensity of participation  and are inspired by Milbrath (1965) 
and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995).  The top layer in both pyramids is comprised of 
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people occupying a political mandate, with many other forms of political activity underneath. 
These other, descending forms of activity can be party-based (e.g. candidacy at elections) or 
not (e.g. an interest in politics). Several relationships between the different layers of the two 
pyramids can be established. Political dynasties, for instance, connect parents occupying a 
mandate with children doing the same.  
 
<< Figure 1 about here >> 
 
In this article, the focus will be on the effect of family politicization on party membership 
activity. Whereas for election candidates and elected representatives, both supply-side factors 
(i.e. socialization process) and demand-side factors (i.e. name recognition) provide an 
advantage to people grown up in political families (Van Liefferinge, 2012) , only supply-side 
factors are at stake for party membership activity. Participating in party activities is mostly 
freely accessible, as no election or delegation (in which family name could play a role) is 
needed. The central question is therefore whether family politicization also increases chances 
of this kind of participation. We will use a dichotomous variable for the parents’ participation 
(i.e. whether or not they are party members), and focus on the effect on activities that their 
children perform in a party. We are fully aware that this approach only takes one aspect of 
family politicization into account, but in order to conduct a feasible analysis, the broad 
concept of family politicization simply needs to be narrowed down. Moreover, by linking the 
parents’ party membership to the children’s party membership and party membership 
activities, the relationship between two comparable activities is investigated. The inner 
triangles in the pyramids in Figure 1 illustrate our central research question, namely whether 
growing up in a family in which at least one parent is a party member affects party members’ 
activity level. We will come back to this operationalization in the Methods section of this 
paper (section 4). 
 
How does family politicization work? 
 
In the introduction of this paper, we already referred to the interaction between supply and 
demand factors to explain the overrepresentation of political family members among 
candidates and office holders. As our research population consists of party members, we will 
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mainly focus on supply factors. We assume that political engagement can be affected by both 
political socialization and political motivation, which are interrelated as well.  
 
The political family is generally considered to have a socialization influence at three levels, 
i.e. as an early awakener of political interest, as a transmitter of political values, and as a 
stimulator of political engagement. 
In the first place, a political family can function as an awakener of political interest. 
Socialization is a lifelong process, which is largely shaped by family, school, peer groups and 
mass media (Greenstein, 1968). However, socialization in childhood (and to a lesser extent 
also adolescence) may have greater impact than socialization in adulthood. Because of the 
frequent contact during the first, impressionable, life period, primary groups such as the 
family play a pivotal role in shaping a child’s political consciousness (Zuckerman, Dasovic, & 
Fitzgerald, 2007). Parents do not need to have the same political opinions for this effect to 
materialize: it was found that especially in systems of proportional representation, political 
discord among parents (and consequently political debate within the family context) 
stimulates political interest among children (Fitzgerald & Curtis, 2012). In particular, elite 
research among American and Canadian MPs, conducted by Kornberg and Thomas (1965), 
revealed that the period in which political awareness was initiated strongly correlated with the 
socialization agent they referred to as most important: MPs who developed their initial 
political consciousness in childhood mostly refer to the family as a primary socialization 
agent, whereas those whose interest awoke later tend to stress more often their own political 
awakening and external events, respectively. 
  
A second function of political families is to act as a transmitter of political values. 
Politically active parents do not only inspire children’s interest, they can also affect their 
offspring’s future political values. Although in his early publications Jennings tended to 
downgrade the role of family political inheritance (Jennings & Niemi, 1968), he later stressed 
the importance of contextual conditions to stimulate a successful value transmission. These 
conditions come down to politics being concrete, affect-laden and salient in the home 
atmosphere, and parents being politically homogeneous
2
 and having conversations with their 
children about politics (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009). 
                                                          
2
 Note that heterogeneity in values among parents stimulates political interest, as indicated above, but also has 
a negative effect on the transmission of political values. 
7 
 
One interesting study in this respect is Thomas (1971), who studied the parent-adolescent 
congruence in strongly politicized families (i.e. families who are active in politics) and 
perceived a comparatively high intergenerational level of agreement on 12 topics. Similarly, 
Zuckerman, Dasovic and Fitzgerald (2007) found that German and British parents play a very 
important role in influencing partisanship, including identification with a particular party and 
vote choice. Kroh and Selb (2009) demonstrated that partisan loyalties passed on from parents 
to children in their younger years are more central and affective, and therefore tend to be more 
resistant to change than loyalties emanating from other sources. 
Apart from these approaches which stress the role of the environment, also biopolitical 
insights provide arguments for an intergenerational correspondence of opinions. Hatemi et al 
(2011) for instance contend that a part of family resemblance on political attitudes is 
genetically influenced. Attitudes in this view are the product of biological processes (which 
regulate for instance anxiety and disgust) that interact with several environmental influences 
during one’s lifecycle. 
All these features of family politicization in combination with biopolitical processes suggest 
that children will share political values with their parents and are therefore also more likely to 
end up in the same political party. 
 
Finally, a third potential role of a political family is to stimulate political engagement. In 
this respect, Fox  and  Lawless  (2005)  make  a  distinction between ‘expressive’ and 
‘nascent’ ambitions. The former refer to the rational consideration to run for office 
(Schlesinger, 1966), whereas the  latter refer to  the  desire to engage in politics. Fox  and  
Lawless  (2005)  examine six predictors on nascent political ambition, of which politicized 
upbringing appears to be the third most important one. They conclude that the magnitude of 
pre-professional experiences is striking. Family politicization thus often creates a politically 
stimulating environment for the offspring, generating lasting effects. In addition, also diverse 
psychological and personality aspects play a role, especially the degree of identification with 
the parent’s political role (Recchi, 1999).  
 
To conclude, family politicization can lead to an earlier and more intense (inherited) build-up 
of political capital, which can have a stimulating effect on the motivation to further develop 
this inherited political capital with one’s own assets and capital. Together with demand 
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factors (which are less relevant for party membership), these factors give a competitive 
advantage to people coming from a politicized family. 
 
Functions of party members 
We will now deal with functions party members can perform in the party. Together with 
theoretical insights from the previous section, this will lead to hypotheses. 
Notwithstanding the wide-spread idea that electoral-professional parties have become 
increasingly more dependent on (social) media en and less on large membership bases 
(Panebianco, 1988; Scarrow, 2000; Van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012), it can clearly be 
observed that most parties continue to make efforts to attract members (Scarrow, 1994). 
Members are still worthwhile for parties since they continue to fulfill a number of crucial 
functions. We make a distinction here between three kinds of functions: electoral, 
legitimization and policy-oriented functions. 
 
First of all, we describe the electoral functions, which have many aspects.  
Party members are likely to vote for their party. As such, they may provide their party with a 
stable voting base (Scarrow, 1994), although it should not be taken for granted that party 
members always vote for their own party.  
Party members could adopt also a more active role by encouraging others to vote for the 
party. This can be done in informal face-to-face contacts, by distributing leaflets, etc. Party 
members could be considered as party ambassadors generating support (Scarrow, 1994) or 
even as part-time marketeers (Van Aelst, van Holsteyn, & Koole, 2012). These activities 
could provide an invaluable complement to the media-oriented approach of campaign 
professionals and party leaders, as it allows parties to build stronger ties with voters and 
clearly expresses that the party is more than a selected elite far away from the citizens’ needs 
(Scarrow, 2000).  
Finally, party members constitute a large pool of potential election candidates. Parties without 
a large membership base might encounter problems in filling all positions on their candidate 
lists. As the influence of family politicization on election candidates has already been 
extensively researched (e.g. Van Liefferinge, 2012; Dal Bó, Dal Bó, & Snyder, 2009), this 
element falls outside the scope of this study.  
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A second group of functions of party members is made up by legitimization functions. The 
increased role of rank and file members in intra-party decision-making is a recent trend in 
many Western parties. In most parties, they can now choose party leaders and candidates for 
parliamentary elections and they are allowed to vote at party conferences (e.g. LeDuc, 2001; 
Barnea & Rahat, 2007; Pilet & Cross, 2014). These organizational changes increased (at least 
on paper) the impact of party members.  Yet, the results of this process are rather ambiguous 
(Young & Cross, 2002; Wauters, 2009). Party statutes are officially amended but it did not 
have a real influence on the way party elites behaved as there was no shift in the internal 
balance of power in practice. On the contrary, these internal reforms have often even 
strengthened the powerful position of party leaders, since their actions are now officially 
authorized by party members (Wauters, 2014). In that sense do these participation procedures 
legitimize the party elite and their actions, rather than providing party members with a real 
impact. As such these participation activities can be labelled as legitimation activities. 
 
Finally, we pay attention to the policy-oriented functions. A small but significant part of 
party members see their membership as an instrument to influence the policy options of their 
party (e.g. Cross & Young, 2004). By actively participating in party meetings, they try to 
influence a party’s policy. Miller and Schofield (2003) attach great importance to members 
for the ideological choices of their party. Policy-motivated activists are a force of stability and 
they discourage ideological change, while the party elite are more prepared to change the 
ideological position of the party in order to win elections and to enter government.  
 
In the methodology section, we will indicate how we operationalize these three functions. In 
combination with the theoretical considerations on family politicization, we come to the 
following three hypotheses: 
 
H1: The level of family politicization among party members will be lower than among 
election candidates 
H2: Party members from a politicized family will belong predominantly to the same party as 
their parents 
H3: Party members from a politicized family will be more active in party activities 
H3a: they will be more active in promoting the party externally / participating in 
election campaigns  
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H3b: they will be more active in legitimation activities (participation at one moment in 
time)  
H3c: they will be more active in taking up positions within the party / making the 
party function 
 
Methodology 
For our empirical analysis, we rely on a survey conducted in four parties in Flanders (a major 
region in Belgium). This survey among party members allows us to investigate the 
involvement in a wide range of specific party activities. This is in contrast with general cross-
country surveys, who are conducted among the population at large (instead of only among 
party members) and who contain (if any) only questions about involvement in party activities 
in general. The same applies to household surveys. Lacking cross-country surveys among 
party members, our approach is the best option to grasp the effect of family politicization on 
party member activity. 
Our focus is on Belgium, which has a political system in which parties play a dominant role 
(Deschouwer, 2009; Van Haute et al., 2013). Parties have strong roots in society by large 
membership bases, which tend to decline more slowly than in other countries.  
In the course of 2012, we conducted a postal survey among party members of the Flemish-
regionalist party N-VA and the liberal-democratic OpenVLD in Belgium, using the Total 
Design-method (TDM) of Dilman (1978). The same method was used one year later to survey 
party members of the Christian-democratic party CD&V and the ecologist party Groen.
3
 
Although we followed the same method, response rates varied from one party to another. N-
VA members recorded the highest response rate with 65.5%, followed by Groen with 62.0% 
and CD&V with 44.3%. For OpenVLD (whose membership file suffered from several 
inaccuracies), we obtained a response rate of only 28.9%. 
 
We will use these data to conduct analyses of family politicization and its effects. For our 
analysis, we take into consideration both the participation level of the parents (whether or not 
                                                          
3
 Apart from the four parties studied in this article, there are two other Flemish parties represented in 
Parliament: the extreme right Vlaams Belang and the social-democratic sp.a. Vlaams Belang refused to 
cooperate, while for sp.a data are still being gathered at the moment of writing. 
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they were a party member, based on the declarations of their children
4
), and that of the 
children themselves (i.e. our survey respondents), the former constituting our central 
independent variable and the latter our central dependent variable. Non-party political 
engagement of parents is not taken into account here. The inner triangles in the pyramids in 
Figure 1 in Section 2 illustrate our central research question, namely whether growing up in a 
family in which at least one parent was a party member, affects how active children are as 
party member. 
There are different ways to categorize our central independent variable, i.e. whether or not 
parents have been a party member. One could differentiate between members with both, only 
one or none of the parents being a party member. Another differentiation could be made 
between parents belonging to the same party and parents adhering to a different party than 
their children. Yet another distinction could be made between parents as office holders, active 
members or passive members, but this distinction will lead us too far. We will deal more 
extensively with the other different possible categorizations (and their frequencies) in the 
descriptive analysis of our results. For the explanatory analysis, we limit family politicization 
to two variables, i.e. members with at least one parent belonging to a party and members with 
a parent of the same party. 
As for the dependent variables, we will consider (as indicated in the second section) three 
different functions that party members can fulfill. Rather than only examining the frequency 
of party activities in general (e.g. Van Haute et al., 2013), we will also take into account the 
diversity in activities.   
We will measure the electoral functions by studying the frequency of undertaking each of the 
following campaign activities: distributing door-to-door flyers during an election campaign, 
convincing others to vote for the party, and putting up election posters at one’s home.5 
For the legitimization functions, the analysis will center around three activities: attending a 
national party conference, voting in party leadership elections, and voting for the composition 
of candidate lists.
6
 These are three activities in which rank and file members can directly 
                                                          
4
 The question was ‘Has one of your parents ever been a member of a political party? Only father, only mother, 
both father and mother, or neither of them? And if so, which party?’ 
5
 An exploratory factor analysis show that they indeed measure the same concept. Factor loadings (after a 
varimax rotation) range from 0.541 to 0.769.  Cronbach's alpha was 0.732. 
6
 Factor loadings (after a varimax rotation) range here from 0.683 to 0.865. Cronbach's alpha was 0.770. 
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participate (a system of delegation is not used anymore in the four parties under 
consideration).  
A final group of functions refers to activities aiming to actively influence the party’s policy 
and strategy. Activities that are catalogued under this heading include participating in a debate 
at a local party meeting, being a candidate for an internal function or position, and preparing 
and organizing internal party meetings.
7
  
For each of these activities, one question in our survey asked how often party members have 
conducted this activity for their current party (never, only once, a number of times, 
often/always). In order to have enough observations in each category, these variables were 
recoded into dummy variables indicating whether or not the respondent has participated more 
than once. 
Before analyzing the impact of family ties on activities that party members fulfill, we will 
first present a descriptive analysis of the extent and the different forms of family politicization 
in the four parties of our analysis. 
Descriptive analysis 
Looking at how many party members come from politicized families,  we can distinguish 
between three groups of party members. For a first group, one of the parents was also a party 
member. In a second group, both parents were party members, and in a third group neither of 
the parents were a party member. In Table 1 results are displayed for our respondents, 
arranged according to the party to which they belong. 
<< Table 1 about here >> 
In all four parties being investigated, most members’ parents were non-party affiliated. 
However, clear differences exist. Especially the Christian Democrats (CD&V) come from 
politicized families, with about 45% having at least one parent who was a party member. The 
lowest number of parental party members is found in the green party (Groen), namely about 
27%.  
The differences are especially clear in families with both parents as party member, where we 
see that more than one quarter of CD&V members come from these ‘strongly’ politicized 
families, compared to only approximately 10% of green party members. The figures for only 
                                                          
7
 Factor loadings (after a varimax rotation) range here from 0.769 to 0.887.  Cronbach's alpha was 0.862. 
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one parent being a party member show less diversity across the parties, and in the light of a 
general lower female political participation especially in previous generations (Scarrow & 
Gezgor, 2010), it is not surprising that fathers are considerably more often party members.  
In fact, any differences between the various parties are not surprising either, as traditional 
parties have a much longer record in politics and government, and especially the Christian 
Democratic party has always been strongly rooted at the local level, with large numbers of 
councilors and mayors (Olislagers & Steyvers, 2013). Moreover, due to ‘pillarization’, many 
people were linked to the party via membership of various satellite organizations (which was 
often, together with party membership, transmitted within a family) (Van Haute et al., 2013). 
The green party, in contrast, is much younger (established in 1979), has from the beginning 
onwards mainly recruited from non-traditional sources and has never developed an own 
network of organizations.  
Earlier, we already mentioned some figures for comparison (based on previous research on 
election candidates). Nearly 55% of the Flemish candidates of the 2003 and 2007 federal 
elections appeared to have a father and/or mother who were party members (Van Liefferinge, 
2012). We could also observe that the green party has the lowest number of candidates with at 
least one parent affiliated to a party (38.2%), whereas the Christian Democrats have the 
highest number in this respect (65.8%). Percentages of family politicized election candidates 
are higher than percentages for party members, but the same differences between parties can 
be found. 
From these comparisons, it seems that family politicization increases when we move up the 
political participation ladder. Party members generally come less from politicized families 
than election candidates, which confirms our first hypothesis (H1). This can be explained by 
what we referred to above, namely that family ties play a bigger role in the recruitment 
process because at that level demand factors are in play (e.g. the importance of name 
recognition for election). 
A second important aspect to be studied is the extent to which parents and children adhere to 
the same party.  
<< Table 2 about here >> 
We immediately notice huge differences across the various parties. Once again, CD&V and 
Groen make out the two extremes, with the former showing a very high rate of party members 
who belong to the same party as their parents (more than 9 out of 10), while for the latter the 
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reverse is true (about one fourth). With almost three out of four liberal party members 
belonging to their parents’ party, OpenVLD has a relatively high score, whereas N-VA 
occupies a middle position with over half of the members following their parents.   
To explain these numbers, we can repeat the above-mentioned reasons, such as the age of the 
party and her roots at the local level. In addition to these explanations, CD&V was the party 
with the highest number of families in which both parents were party members. Linking this 
back to Thomas (1971) and Jennings et al. (2009) who underlined the importance of a 
homogeneous socialization environment for value transmission to be successful, this high 
number can certainly play a role. For the regionalist party N-VA in particular, also the recent 
influx of new members (parallel with their enormous increase in vote shares) could be an 
explanation: they recruited not only voters from other parties, but also party members 
(Wauters, 2013). Consequently, the share of members belonging to the same party as their 
parents is lower than we would expect from a party with a long history (taken also into 
account its predecessor the VU).  
Given this evidence, our second hypothesis (H2) could only partially be confirmed. When 
children are member of established parties, they mostly follow the party preference of their 
active parents while when choosing to join new parties, they sometimes defect from the party 
of their parents. 
Comparing these data to the candidate survey results again reveals similar tendencies. The 
figures ranged from 38% of candidates with no parental party membership, sharing their 
father’s political preference, over 61% in ‘slightly’ politicized families, to 80.9% in ‘highly’ 
politicized families (Van Liefferinge, 2012). 
 
Family politicization as an explanatory variable for party activity 
In the following section, we will explore the effects of family politicization on the activities 
that party members undertake. As indicated above, we expect party members who have 
parents that have been politically engaged in a party to be more active. 
In Table 3, we present the results for two variables, one that adopts a general approach by 
taking into account parents’ membership irrespective of the party they belonged to, and a 
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more specific variable that only considers parents’ membership of the same party as their 
children. The results for both variables are largely similar. 
<< Table 3 about here >> 
Table 3 reveals clear differences between party members from a politicized family and other 
members. These differences can mainly be situated in the electoral and legitimization 
functions, and not in the policy-oriented functions.
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As for the electoral functions, it is striking that party members from a politicized family are 
significantly more likely to distribute door-to-door flyers: about 48% of party members from a 
politicized family have more than once distributed flyers versus about 42% member without 
family roots. The same applies to displaying election posters at one’s home: 59% of party 
members from a politicized family have done this before, versus 51.7% and 53.3% for 
members without parents as party member. There is only one electoral function that does not 
exhibit significant differences, and that is convincing others to vote. If we restrict the analysis 
to parents belonging to the same party (columns 3 and 4 in Table 3), more or less the same 
picture appears: significant differences for flyers and election posters, no significant 
differences for convincing others. 
Convincing people is less visible and perhaps therefore more comfortable for those party 
members from whom it is not widely known that they and their family are party members. 
Another possible explanation may be found in the fact that we did not specify how many or 
what kind of other people they tried to convince. For example, it might be that party members 
from a politicized family try to convince a broad range of people (including their family 
members, friends and neighbors), but that other party members approach only a handful of 
very close relatives. A third explanation for the lack of effect could be that this is an activity 
conducted by a large group of members. With almost 60% of members declaring that they 
have more than once tried to convince others, this activity obtains the top score. 
Consequently, barriers to this kind of activity will be lower, which could explain the lack of 
effect of socialization and of family politicization in particular.  
Nevertheless, it is safe to say that hypothesis 3a (H3a), stating that political family members 
will be more active in promoting the party externally, is generally confirmed. 
                                                          
8
 The same observations can be made when we examine all answer categories of the original question (never, 
once, several times, often/always). Family politicized party members are more likely to be found in the higher 
categories for  electoral and legitimization functions, but not for policy-oriented functions. 
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For the legitimization functions, significant differences can also be observed between party 
members from a politicized family and other members. Both for attending a national party 
conference, voting in party leadership elections and voting for the composition of the 
candidates lists, members with family ties are more likely to participate, hereby confirming 
hypothesis 3b (H3b). Unlike for electoral functions, differences between party members from 
a politicized family and other members become larger when we only take into account 
members whose parents belonged to the same party. For instance, for participation in 
leadership elections, the difference between party members from a politicized family and 
other members is 38.2% versus 27.2%, while this gap widens when we only consider 
membership of the same party (44.3% versus 27.7%). In sum, for legitimization functions, it 
is not only party membership of the parents that matters, but also party membership of the 
same party that provides an extra explanation.  
Finally, the policy-oriented functions will be examined. In contrast to the previous functions, 
no significant differences can be noted between members with a pedigree in the party and 
others (except for being a candidate in internal elections, where a tiny significant effect can be 
noted). This applies to the three activities that belong to this category, i.e. debating in local 
party meetings, being a candidate for an internal position and organizing internal party 
meetings. Consequently, hypothesis 3c (H3c) is rejected.  
Two possible explanations for this lack of effect can be given. First of all, it might be that 
members just copy their parents’ behavior. In the questionnaire, it was asked whether parents 
have been party member, not whether they conducted policy-oriented activities. As these 
kinds of activities are performed by fewer party members than other party activities (for 
instance, 15% have been a candidate for an internal function, while 60% have convinced 
others), the chance of parents conducting this activity is lower, so socialization effects for this 
specific activity will also be lower. A second explanation elaborates this point further. Since 
fewer members participate in this kind of activity, we expect barriers for participation (having 
enough time, resources, etc.) to be higher. When thresholds are so high, family politicization 
alone cannot overcome them, especially when demand factors do not provide extra support. 
Taken together with our findings for convincing others to vote (where we could not find a 
significant effect either), we could conclude that for activities where participation thresholds 
are either very high or very low, the effect of family politicization disappears. 
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In order to test the robustness of our findings, we also conducted binominal logistic 
regressions with the degree of party activity as a dependent variable. This allows us to control 
for the effect of other socio-demographic variables, such as age, gender and level of 
education. We also include the reason to join the party as a control variable. It has been shown 
that this has an impact on the activity rate and the kind of activities performed inside the 
party, especially by young party members (Bruter & Harrison, 2009). A distinction can be 
made in this respect between purposive incentives (altruistic and ideological motives), social 
incentives (meeting minded-like people) and material incentives (in order to obtain a 
particular benefit) to become member.  
In Table 4, we present the results of only one of these regressions (i.e. with participation to 
leadership elections as a dependent variable). For the regressions with the other party 
activities, the results are similar, in the sense that the effects found in the previous table 
(Table 3) are not altered when the control variables are added
9
, except for being a candidate 
for an internal position or function. 
<< Table 4 about here >> 
Table 4 indeed shows that family party membership continues to have an effect on the 
propensity to participate in leadership elections: the odds of voting for the party leader are 
twice as high for party members whose parents belonged to the same party (2.338) compared 
to members without parents who are a party member. This clearly confirms that this effect 
holds even when we control for socio-demographic variables and for reasons to join the party. 
This applies to all other party activities discussed above: where an effect was found in the chi² 
analysis in Table 3 (electoral and legitimization functions), it was confirmed in the logistic 
regressions, and where no effect was found (policy-oriented functions), no effect appeared in 
the logistic regressions. 
One notable exception is being a candidate for an internal function or position. The effect of 
family party membership on this kind of activity was not significant in all bivariate analyses 
(see Table 3), but did become significant in the logistic regression (see Table 5). We should 
note, however, that the level of significance is lower than for the other party activities. Given 
                                                          
9
 We also ran the same logistic regressions with an additional control variable that indicated whether or not 
one was a member of the local party executive. The results were not altered: family politicization continued to 
be significant for legitimization and electoral functions, and not for policy-oriented functions (not for being a 
candidate for an internal mandate either). Because being a member of the local executive and being a 
candidate for an internal mandate are logically related and a tautological reasoning could be made, we chose 
to present the analyses here without this control variable.   
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that being a candidate for an internal function is an activity in which demand factors could 
play a role, this effect is actually not surprising. 
<< Table 5 about here >> 
Although not directly relevant for the purposes of this paper, it should be noted that age and 
gender have significant effects on the chance to participate in party leadership elections. Men 
and older members (older than 65) are more likely to participate. Idealism as a reason to join 
the party also appears to have a positive effect, whereas level of education did not 
significantly impact on participation in leadership elections. Further research should further 
explore these differences. 
 
Conclusion 
Family politicization can be interpreted as a general dynamic that has an effect at diverse 
levels of participation. Children growing up in politicized families are relatively exposed to 
politics from a young age onwards, which can stimulate their own political awaking and 
eventually boost their motivation and engagement. This could be referred to as a supply-side 
factor. For election candidates and political officeholders, who rank higher on the 
participation pyramid, this effect is strengthened by demand-side factors (including name 
recognition among voters), giving them an additional advantage compared to other people. 
In this paper, we examined the relationship between family politicization and intra-party 
activism. This relationship is theoretically interesting as for this kind of activism, demand-
side factors are less relevant because election (in which name recognition could be useful) is 
not needed in order to participate in most of these activities. The main theoretical question is 
whether supply-side factors alone can offer people an advantage in high-intensity 
participation activities within a party. 
Dividing party members’ functions in three types, we differentiated between electoral, 
legitimization and policy-oriented functions. Family politicization, measured by parental party 
membership, appeared to play a role in electoral and legitimization functions, as members 
from politicized families participated significantly more in this type of activities (especially 
when members followed their parents in the same party), but not for policy-oriented 
functions.  We concluded that the supply-side factors of family politicization affect the level 
of intra-party activism, unless the participation threshold is either high (policy-oriented 
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functions) or low (convincing others). In these cases, family politicization cannot affect the 
activity level of party members, as other factors are more at play (e.g. available time in high-
threshold activities). To a certain extent the higher presence of people with family ties in 
politics can be explained by supply-side factors, but for very intense participation demand 
factors (name recognition leading to electoral success) also need to be present. 
All in all, our analysis shows that also grassroots party members are affected by family 
politicization. Earlier research has shown that this phenomenon influences the recruitment 
process among election candidates and mayors (Van Liefferinge, 2012), but it is now clear 
that it also impacts on party members. Moreover, with figures between 27% and 45% of all 
party members having at least one parent who was a party member, this is not a trivial 
phenomenon. Especially when members are following their parents in the same party, they 
can be considered as a loyal and predictable member base. The party knows whom they can 
count on for spreading and displaying campaign material and who will participate in internal 
voting procedures. For very intense participation within the party, here called policy-oriented 
functions, family ties do not provide an added value. This seems to be at odds with the high 
presence of family members among election candidates, which also constitutes a high-
intensity form of participation. Nevertheless, election candidates who come from a politicized 
family also benefit from an inherited political and electoral capital (i.e. demand factors), and it 
is this that gives them a major advantage and explains their relative overrepresentation in 
today’s elected political bodies.  
Finally, it is important to note that family politicization could be an asset for parties in 
decline, especially when the engagement of people from politicized families remains within 
the same party and does not involve any considerable efforts. Although quite a lot of party 
members grew up in politicized families and although this is not a neutral fact, it would be an 
overestimation to say that the family can save a party. However, it is true that they can be a 
stabilizing factor for parties in decline. Parties experiencing difficulties to convince people to 
join as a member and especially to activate their members can rely on those members who 
have this little extra motivation because of their family roots. It is therefore crucial that parties 
cherish these ‘deeply rooted’ members, while still attracting other, new members. To 
conclude, we must not forget that family politicization has little or no effect on policy-
oriented functions. In other words, while family politicization may soothe the wounds of 
decline, it cannot completely cure them. 
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We end by discussing some limitations of our study. Studying current party members and 
interrogating them about the party membership of their parents results in the selection of only 
successful cases, and limits the information about parental party membership. First, by 
surveying (grown-up) children about the party membership of their parents, only parents who 
have children that has become party member are included in the analysis. We cannot say 
anything about e.g. the share of parents that have children who also become party member. 
Second, the dependent variable of our analyses was the activity rate of children in the party. 
We explain this by the party membership of the parents (irrespective of whether parents were 
active or not in the party). Perhaps, the explanatory power of the model would be even larger 
if we could include the activity rate of the parents, but data availability hinders us to do so 
here. Future research (for instance through panel studies or household studies) should tackle 
these problems, preferentially also in a comparative cross-country analysis. 
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Figure 1. Family politicization: linking parents’ and children’s political activities  
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Table 1. Percentages of party members whose parents have also been a party member  
 CD&V Groen N-VA OpenVLD 
One parent 18.8 16.4 19.8 18.9 
     Only father  16.5 13.8 18.3 16.5 
     Only mother  2.3 2.6 1.5 2.4 
Both parents 26.0 10.5 16.1 20.1 
Total: at least one parent 44.8 26.9 35.9 39.0 
Neither of the parents 55.2 73.1 64.1 61.0 
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Table 2. Percentages of parents who have been a member of the same party or a different 
party, respectively 
 CD&V Groen N-VA10 OpenVLD 
Same party 91.6 24.1 50.7 73.7 
Different party 8.4 75.9 49.3 26.3 
 
  
                                                          
10
 VU was considered the same party as N-VA. VNV, a Flemish-nationalist party active in the inter-war period, in 
contrast, was not considered the same party. 
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Table 3. Percentages of members that have conducted activities more than once, divided into two 
categories: parents who have been a member of any political party, and those who have been a 
member of the same political party (chi² test) 
How often have you conducted these 
activities for your current party? 
Parents member of a 
political party? 
Parents of the same 
party? 
No 
parents 
member 
Parents 
member 
No 
parents 
member 
Parents 
member 
Electoral functions     
distributing door-to-door flyers 42.5 48.7** 43.4 49.4* 
convincing others to vote for the party 57.6 60.0 58.6 57.7 
displaying election posters at  home 51.7 59.9*** 53.3 59.3* 
Legitimization functions     
attending a national party conference 17.1 21.6** 17.8 22.1* 
voting for the selection of the party leader 27.3 38.2*** 27.7 44.3*** 
voting for candidate lists 21.4 29.7*** 21.9 33.6*** 
Policy-oriented functions     
participating in debates at local party 
meeting 
28.0 30.9 29.0 28.8 
candidate for internal function or position 12.8 16.0* 13.6 15.3 
organizing internal party meetings 17.3 19.2 17.9 18.2 
     
N 1835 948 2228 555 
* p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4. Binominal logistic regression with frequency of participation to leadership elections (more 
than once or not) as a dependent variable 
 B Standard 
Error 
Wald Exp (B) 
Age (reference: older than 65)  *** 67.009  
          Younger than 35 years old -1.418 .176*** 64.608 .242 
          Between 35 and 65 years old -.524 .106*** 24.511 .592 
     
Woman (dummy) -.378 .098*** 14.829 .685 
     
Level of education (reference: university)  (ns) 2.919  
          Lower education or no degree -.012 .238 .002 .988 
          Lower secondary -.055 .164 .114 .946 
          Higher secondary -.203 .125 2.656 .816 
          Higher non-university          -.078 .119 .432 .925 
     
Purposive 
incentives 
Because I agree with the socio-economic points 
of view of my party 
-.094 .094 1.003 .910 
Out of idealism .528 .095*** 31.206 1.696 
Social 
incentives 
Because of the pleasant and interesting 
activities they are organizing 
.300 .243 1.523 1.350 
Because friends asked me -.219 .147 2.231 .803 
Because of the good and amicable atmosphere 
in the party 
.154 .148 1.091 1.167 
Material 
incentives 
Because of the help and counselling offered 
when I encountered problems  
.305 .196 2.418 1.356 
Good contacts with politicians can be useful in 
obtaining benefits  
.105 .244 .185 1.111 
To obtain a job or political mandate .179 .329 .298 1.196 
     
Family party membership (same party) .849 .109*** 60.901 2.338 
Constant -.154 .174   
Nagelkerke’s R² = 0.11 ; * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; p < 0.001 
  
29 
 
Table 5. Binominal logistic regression with frequency of being a candidate for an internal function or 
position (more than once or not) as a dependent variable 
 B Standard 
Error 
Wald Exp (B) 
Age (reference: older than 65)  (ns) 1.068  
          Younger than 35 years old -.016 .207 .006 .984 
          Between 35 and 65 years old .121 .153 .632 1.129 
     
Woman (dummy) -.323 .130* 6.188 .724 
     
Level of education (reference: university)  *** 38.801  
          Lower education or no degree -1.197 .423** 8.007 .302 
          Lower secondary -.944 .253*** 13.938 .389 
          Higher secondary -.835 .170*** 24.247 .434 
          Higher non-university          -.100 .140 .514 .905 
     
Purposive 
incentives 
Because I agree with the socio-
economic points of view of my party 
-.138 .122 1.274 .871 
Out of idealism 1.055 .122*** 74.353 2.872 
Social 
incentives 
Because of the pleasant and 
interesting activities they are 
organizing 
.456 .304 2.256 1.577 
Because friends asked me -.356 .215 2.743 .700 
Because of the good and amicable 
atmosphere in the party 
.125 .195 .411 1.133 
Material 
incentives 
Because of the help and counseling 
offered 
when I encountered problems  
-.126 .282 .201 .881 
Good contacts with politicians can be 
useful in obtaining benefits  
-.064 .338 .036 .938 
To obtain a job or political mandate .708 .377 3.520 2.029 
     
Family party membership (same party) .330 .143* 5.300 1.391 
Constant -1.625 .233   
Nagelkerke’s R² = 0.11 ; * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; p < 0.001 
 
 
